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BELIEVING THAT GOD EXISTS
BECAUSE THE BIBLE SAYS SO
John Lamont

The paper considers Renee Descartes' assertion that believing that God
exists because the Bible says so, and believing that what the Bible says is
true because God says it, involves circular reasoning. It argues that there is
no circularity involved in holding these beliefs, and maintains that the
appearance of circularity results from an equivocation. It considers a line of
argument that would defend the rationality of holding these beliefs, but
does not try to prove its soundness.

In the dedicatory letter to the dean and faculty of theology at Paris with
which he prefaces his Meditations, Renee Descartes sarcastically remarks
that it is inadvisable to tell unbelievers that God exists because the Bible
says so, and that what the Bible says is true because God says so,
because this presents the appearance of circular reasoning.] This has
been thought of, by anyone who happened to think of it, as a telling
remark. But in fact Descartes' sarcasm is misplaced. There is no circularity involved in holding that God exists because the Bible says so, and that
what the Bible says is true because God says so.
This can be seen by considering a parallel case. Suppose I receive a
letter from someone who identifies himself as Mr. Jones, the District
Superintendent of the Water Conservation Board. He tells me that it has
come to his attention that I have been watering my lawn for six hours
every day of the week, and he wants me to know that if I do not reduce
my water consumption I will be fined and my water will be cut off. I am
a bit surprised at this message, since I have never heard of Mr. Jones or
the Water Conservation Board before, but I accept that what the letter
says is true.
In this case it is clear that I can believe what the letter says without
being guilty of circular reasoning. But then I will be believing that Mr.
Jones exists because the letter says it, and I will be believing what the letter says because Mr. Jones says it. Replace the letter by the Bible, and Mr.
Jones by God, and I will believe that God exists because the Bible says so,
and that what the Bible says is true because God says SO.2 Since there is
no circularity in the former case, there is no circularity in the latter.
One might raise the following question: should we say that I believe
the letter because Mr. Jones says it? Do I not simply believe the letter?
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The answer to this question can be seen by considering what I would
say if someone asked me why I believed that my water was going to be
cut off, or why T thought there was such a person as Mr. Jones. I would
answer, "Jones told me these things himself, in the letter he sent me". My
believing the contents of the letter is my believing what Mr. Jones says,
because he says it.
We commonly accept people's identities on the basis of what they tell
us. This happens whenever someone introduces himself to us, and we
believe their introduction ("Hello, I am Mr. X, etc"). Accepting that
someone exists because he tells us so, although less usual, need not be
less reasonable. There is no circularity in believing statements of the
form "X exists because X says so". ("Believing that X exists because X
says so" is of course understood to mean "believing that X exists on the
grounds of X's saying so", not "believing that X's saying that he exists is
the cause of his existence.") Consider this example; suppose there is a
God, and one day an atheist loudly announces his disbelief in God. To
teach the atheist a lesson, God causes the sun to be extinguished so that
the stars appear, and causes all the stars in the sky to arrange themselves
to read "I, God, exist"; at the same time he causes the same words to be
announced in a loud and thunderous voice. Things return to normal
after a few moments, but the atheist is persuaded by these happenings,
and believes that God exists. In these circumstances, the atheist will be
believing that God exists because God says so, and there will be no circularity involved in his belief.
It is helpful to consider how my beliefs would be connected in these
cases, in order to see that they are not circular. In the case of the letter, I
start off by reading the letter, and this leads me to form the following
belief;
B1. The letter says that Mr. Jones exists, is its author, intends to cut
off my water, etc. (let "etc." stand for all the rest of the content of
the letter).
I trust the letter, and thus believe
B2. Mr. Jones exists, etc. and is the author of the letter.
When I reflect on my reason for believing that Jones exists, etc., I form
the belief that
B3. Mr. Jones exists, etc., because the letter says so.
When I ask myself why Taccept the contents of the letter, Tconclude
B4. What the letter says is true because Mr. Jones says it.
The appearance of circularity in B3 and B4 arises from an equivocation
on "says". In B3, "the letter says" refers to the act of assertion of the letter.
B3 states that I accept the content of the letter ("Mr. Jones exists, etc.")
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because the letter asserts it. In B4, "what the letter says" refers to the content of the letter's assertion. Let P represent the content of the letter. We
can rewrite B3 and B4 as follows;
B3'. P is true because the letter asserts it.
B4'. P is true because Mr. Jones asserts it.
B3' and B4', it can be seen, are not circular, but equivalent, because the
letter's asserting P is Mr. Jones's asserting P. P contains the statement
that Mr. Jones exists, so my holding B4' will imply that I believe that
(Mr. Jones exists because Mr. Jones says so), but, as we have seen, such a
statement is not circular. Replace Mr. Jones by God, and the letter by the
Bible, and the same considerations apply.
The absence of circularity lends support to a point recently made by
professors Anscombe and Geach:
... Plantinga and Wolterstorff ... are both explicitly opposed to foundationalism. Why, they would ask, should not beliefs in the existence of God and other articles of the Christian creed be treated as
themselves "properly basic"? A good question. It is not on the face
of it absurd to come to belief in God as part of a package deal, as
part of a revelation.'
Plantinga's views can provide reasons why we should treat belief in God
as properly basic, when it is accepted as part of a revelation. Belief in the
Bible, belief in a purported revelation, is an instance of belief in testimony. Plantinga, following Thomas Reid, Geach and Richard Swinburne,
asserts that "... the warrant furnished by testimony isn't and couldn't be
furnished by induction, analogy, and abduction. Testimony is an independent source of warrant for me;" - and presumably for everyone else as
well- "testimonial evidence is a basic sort of evidence for me."4 One could
thus argue: testimony is a basic sort of evidence, that provides warrant
on its own; believing in the Bible is believing in testimony; therefore
believing that God exists because the Bible says so is warranted.
I do not mean to defend this argument here. Such a defence would
require addressing the questions of proper basicality, of the nature of testimony, of credulity, of evidence against the existence of God. I merely seek to
indicate lines of inquiry that can be pursued, when we realize that there is no
circularity involved in believing that God exists because the Bible says so.
The Queen's College
Oxford
NOTES
1. "Et quoi qu'il soit absolument vrai, qu'il}aut croire qu'il y a un Dieu,
parce qu'il est ainsi enseigne dans les Saintes Ecritures, et d'autre part qu'il
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faut croire les Saintes Ecritures, parce qu'elles viennent de Dieu; et ceci parce
que, la foi etant un don de Dieu, celui-la meme qui donne la grace pour faire
croire les autres choses, la peut aussi donner pour nous faire croire qu'il
existe: on ne saurait neanmoins proposer cela aux infideles, qui pourraient
s'imaginer que 1'0n commettrait en ceci la faute que les logiciens nomment
un Cercle." Renee Descartes, Oeuvres Philosophiqucs, Tome II (1638-1642),
Ferdinand Alquie ed. (Paris: Editions Garnier Freres, 1967), p.364. This passage is taken from the translation of the Meditations by the duc de Luynes,
that Descartes read and approved. Some might deny that Descartes is being
sarcastic here, and assert that he is only trying to anticipate a possible objection to his procedure in proving the existence of God; he is not really insinuating that there is circularity in such reasoning. I doubt if this is true, but the
question of circularity is worth investigating whether or not Descartes
believed it to exist.
2.
It is worth pointing out that Christians do not all mean the same
thing when they talk about "the Bible". Fr. James Weisheipl, in his introduction to Aquinas's Commentary on the Gospel of John (Albany, N.Y.: Magi
Books, 1980), remarks that "... Luther and Thomas (or any other medieval
theologian) meant two different things by the word Bible, or Sacred
Scriptllres. For Luther and the Reformers the Bible was thought of as a finished, edited, and (by then) printed collection, while Thomas and the
medieval theologians meant the Sacred Word together with the gloss of the
Fathers, liturgy, and the living Church." The argument of this paper can be
applied to either conception of the Bible.
3. Profs. P. Geach and E. Anscombe, review of Philosophers Who Believe:
The Spiritual Journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers, in Priests & People, October 1994,
p.404.
4. Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993), pp. 79-80.

